Building an Agent-Based Model for exploring how informal rules impact the functioning of newly-established Water User Associations in Central Asia by Abrami, G. & Schlueter, M.
Building an Agent-Based Model for exploring how
informal rules impact the functioning of
newly-established Water User Associations in Central
Asia
G. Abrami, M. Schlueter
To cite this version:
G. Abrami, M. Schlueter. Building an Agent-Based Model for exploring how informal rules
impact the functioning of newly-established Water User Associations in Central Asia. 6th
European Social Simulation Association Conference, Sep 2009, Guildford, United Kingdom.
Edmonds,B., 8 p., 2009. <hal-00575815>
HAL Id: hal-00575815
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00575815
Submitted on 11 Mar 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.

Building an Agent-Based Model for exploring how 
informal rules impact the functioning of newly-
established Water User Associations in Central Asia  
Géraldine Abrami1, Maja Schlueter2,3 
1 UMR G-EAU Cemagref 365 rue JF Breton BP 5095 34195 Montpellier, France 
geraldine.abrami@cemagref.fr   
2 UFZ- Helmholtz Center for Environmental Research, Leipzig, Germany 
3 Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, USA 
mschlute@princeton.edu 
  
Abstract. In transition countries informal institutions play a major role and 
often interfere with new formal institutions leading to large discrepancies 
between rules on paper and rules in use. We develop an agent-based model to 
explore the interaction between formal and informal rules and its effect on the 
performance of the formal institutions, based on the example of water user 
associations (WUA) in Uzbekistan. The model is based on field experience 
such as community-based work and role playing games, complemented by 
available literature. In this paper we present the conceptualization of the model, 
its empirical foundation and a first baseline scenario. We model a water user 
association where rules based on formal and informal institutions can be used. 
The baseline scenario represents the results of a totally formal WUA. In a next 
step we will introduce informal rules and explore how they can coexist with 
formal ones. Further work will bring us to question rules’ implementation and 
roles and relationships evolution through selective rules adoption. The model 
will allow exploring under which conditions the institution WUA can function 
well and what might be mechanisms for the selection and adoption of rules by 
individual members.  
Keywords: institutional change, social simulation, water management, Water 
User Associations, Uzbekistan 
1. Introduction : context and objectives 
 Following the third land reform in 2000 that eliminated large collective 
farms the Uzbek government introduced water user associations (WUA) in a top 
down manner to facilitate water allocation to the numerous new small-scale farms 
(Yalcin and Mollinga, 2007). In 2000 – 2003 thousands of WUA were formally 
established and empowered to distribute the water among their users, supposedly in a 
more efficient manner than the former collective farms. However, the goals of 
improvement of agricultural performance and introduction of democratic principles 
on the local level have only partially been achieved. As in other transition countries 
(e.g. Bulgaria, see Theesfeld 2004) the discrepancy between formal political 
intentions and informal effective institutional change on the local level is large. 
Moreover, the high incongruity between formal and effective rules provides 
conditions under which opportunistic behavior is able to grow and persist (Theesfeld 
2004). 
Instead of relying on the formal processes of water allocation in the WUA, for 
example, access to water is often ensured through informal practices such as 
patronage and unauthorized but tolerated water withdrawal (Sehring 2009). In a study 
of two other post Soviet Central Asian republics Sehring (2009) describes how the 
rules and organizations established formally by the state or international donor 
organizations are undermined by informal institutions. She uses the concept of 
“institutional bricolage” to describe how decision-makers and users selectively adopt 
some of these formal rules that compel to their socio-economic logic and neglect the 
others that are not compatible with functioning informal institutions. This “bricolage” 
also means that, on the one hand selected formal rules may be implemented through 
logics based on underlying informal institutions (e.g. fees get payed because 
traditional leaders are asking for it, not because of a market or economic efficiency 
logic), and on the other hand informal institutional roles may evolve with their 
inscription in new formal rules.  
The relationship between formal institutional change and informal institutions has 
so far received only limited attention (Sehring 2009). This research aims at using this 
institutional bricolage framework within social simulation  to investigate how formal 
and informal rules may coexist in a WUA and impact on its efficiency. The model 
presented in this paper is focusing on water allocation and distribution in a WUA 
(distribution is here taken in the sense of allocation implementation, not in the sense 
of scheduling). The main question this model aims at studying at the first stage of this 
research is: how does the system react when, starting from a situation where all actors 
use best practices of the formal institution WUA as described in manuals, we 
gradually introduce actors that behave according to informal rules ? We intend to use 
two dimensions of “good governance” as indicators of the performance of the WUA 
in simulations: social dimension (equity in water allocation) and economic dimension 
(water efficiency).   
This research follows an empirically grounded and parsimonious design process 
(section 2). It is still in a very preliminary stage and this paper presents our conceptual 
model of a very simple WUA where rules based on formal or informal institutions 
may be used (section 3). A first implementation of an ABM of a totally formal WUA 
has been completed and has been used to calibrate a baseline scenario. Based on this 
scenario results, our next step will then be to implement informal rules and explore 
how they can coexist with formal ones. Further work will bring us to question rules’ 
implementation and roles and relationships evolution through selective rules adoption. 
(section 4). 
2. An empirically grounded design process 
This social simulation work is part of a more global research process where it has 
been iteratively linked with community-based field work in Uzbekistan. In a first step 
an initial conceptual model of water management in Khorezm WUAs was set up from 
previous field work and expertise. A RPG was then built on the basis of this 
conceptual model. This RPG was implemented and played 4 times during a field trip 
in Uzbekistan in April 2008.  The participants of these RPG sessions were farmers 
and managers from 2 communities, in Khorezm and South Karakalpakstan. Several 
types of management rules were observed during these sessions, from very formal 
centralised management to a completely informal case with no kind of central 
management though a “bricolage” one exhibiting interpersonal arrangement with a 
formal central institution. Even though we can suspect the participants have exhibited 
best practices during the game sessions, the spectrum covered by these management 
rules is completely coherent with our problematic and we will incorporate these 
observed rules in our model. This will allow us to reflect on past game sessions once 
back on field.  
Parameters and rules we use in the model relate to various kind of source : individual 
decision-making comes from field investigations and literature (e.g. Sehring, 2009); 
formal rules are issued from an IWMI Manual for establishment of WUAs (IWMI, 
2005);  the informal rules relevant in this context such as patronizing or corruption are 
taken from literature and personal experience; finally external constraints such as field 
configuration or water allocation and supply to WUAs figures can be taken from 
forma regulations, official documents or literature such as (Trevisani, 2007). 
Following (Kronenfeld and Kaus 1993, Edmonds et al. 2005) for instance, we 
intend to start with models as simple as possible so that minimal sets of rules are 
defined.To keep the model as parsimonious as possible, it is built “from scratch” by 
starting a very simple formal WUA and then introducing step by step rules from 
informal institutions (patronizing, corruption), checking at each stage the minimal  set 
of parameters needed. Social simulation examples and references to social theories 
will only be introduced later on for comparison and discussion purposes.  
3. Model description 
3.1. Baseline scenario hypotheses and rules 
Our baseline scenario is based on the set of formal rules given by a WUA manual 
issued by IWMI (IWMI, 2004). However, the manual is only providing rules for the 
allocation and distribution of water, so it is also necessary to specify hypotheses and 
simplification on the model WUA configuration. Such hypotheses concern external 
constraints and WUA configuration and physical dynamics : hydrologic and 
agronomic dynamics are aggregated in a timestep of 1 year,  farmers are next after 
each other on a singe canal, and each of them has an identical field,  they have same 
economic parameters and the only allowed crop is cotton. Finally, we consider an 
upstream-downstream effect which represents organizational and technical difficulties 
in delivering the water in a timely and sufficient manner to the users, which become 
more severe along the water flow gradient. 
Future evolution will include notably differentiating farmers with soil types and 
number of fields, as well as considering a cash crop such as rice.  
3.1.1. WUA formal rules and dynamics 
Water allocation and distribution in our baseline model is straightly taken from 
(IWMI, 2004). It reproduces the steps, actions and exchanges of this “best practice” 
formal institution:  1. farmers decide cropping pattern – all cotton in baseline 
scenario; 2. The WUA Engineer assess water needs for each farm – actual water 
needs in baseline scenario; 3. Engineer aggregates water needs; 4. Engineer compares 
water needs to water limit given by external constraints; 5.WUA manager adjust 
cropping patterns to water limit and defines water scarcity rule – same reduction for 
all in baseline scenario; 6.Engineer defines water allocation – equal distribution in 
baseline scenario; 7. Manager and farmers sign contract on crop and water allocation 
plan; 8.Farmers sow – according to contract in baseline scenario; 9.water supply is 
given and Mirab (outlets operator) opens outlets according to water allocation plan 
and water scarcity rule. Water flow in the outlets considering upstream-downstream 
uncertainty effect; 10. farmers bring water to their field; 11. farmers harvest and 
calculate their budget 
3.1.2. Informal institutions 
We consider the following informal institutions in our model.  
Patronage. Patronage is understood here as the preferential treatment of an actor 
because of his relationship with an influential higher level actor, such as a person 
from the administration or a wealthy farmer. We implement patronage by selecting 
individual farmers that will always first receive water according to their needs. This 
results in the definition of an informal rule for step 6 (Engineer designing water 
allocation)  
Unauthorized water withdrawal. According to Sehring (2009) tolerated 
unauthorized water withdrawal can be considered as an informal institution in some 
places in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. We implement unauthorized water withdrawal 
by randomly or according to power allowing farmers to withdraw more water than 
entitled to. This results in the definition of an informal rule for step 9  (Farmer get 
more water from outlet) 
Corruption. The payment of bribes is wide spread in Central Asia (Uzbekistan is on 
place 166 out of 180; 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International, 
2008). We implement corruption by allowing selected farmers to pay money to the 
mirab to achieve immediate access to water. The mirab decides whether he accepts 
the offer or not according to the offers he receives.  This results in the definition of an 
informal rule for step 9 (Mirab open outlets preferentially) 
 
3.2. The conceptual model 
In our model, we use an agent-role pattern to represent the relation between actors 
and rules (Abrami et al, 2005). Individual parameters and constraints are held by 
actors, while their actions are mainly described by rules.  This means that actors are 
intended to follow a rules sequence among which they will be able to choose between 
rules coming from formal or informal institutions. We will set up this choice in our 
simulation scenarios by progressively tuning the set of informal rules. This agent-role 
pattern will ease the further process of exploring individual behaviours and 
constraints and rules implementation. The way we use this architecture can be seen on 
sthe UML class diagram on fig. 1.At step 9, Mirab has to open outlets. He can do so 
with the formal rules of following the water allocation plan; or he can accept being 

























Figure 1. UML Class Diagram showing Farmer and Mirab rules and relations 
in the WUA model. The numbered figured in the rules correspond to the steps 
described in section 3.1.1. Formal rules are tagged with a (F) while informal 
rules are tagged with a (I). 
Only the formal rules have been implemented right now. This implementation has 
been done using Netlogo 4.0.4. This model of a perfect WUA simulates water 
allocation among its members according to the formal rules as indicated in the 
WUA’s manual. Water demand is assessed bottom up based on crop water demands, 
aggregated on the WUA level and compared with the water limits provided by the 
authorities. Based on this comparison cropping plans are adjusted. In case of water 
shortage during the irrigation season reductions are applied equally to all members. 
Performance of individual actors is measured in their net returns gained from 
agriculture. The upstream-downstream effect reduces the net returns of the 
downstream farmers.  
4. Preliminary results and discussion 
This first baseline version uses normalised values for simplicity. We will recalibrate 
the model to field values when necessary. Figure 3A shows the setup of the model 
and results of two calibration simulations. Farmers are located along the main canal 
and each have one outlet to their field. WUA manager and the engineer calculate 
water allocation that is distributed by the mirab (all agents located at the left). The 
different colors of the plants indicate the degree of water stress which increases along 
the resource gradient in a linear fashion. Figures 3B and C show the impact of the 
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Figure 3: (A) Setup of the model (above); (B) farmer budgets after 30 years 
with no upstream-downstream effect, (C) farmer budgets after 30 years with an 
upstream-downstream effect of 0.3. 
 
The model of a perfect WUA simulates water allocation among its members 
according to the formal rules as indicated in the WUA’s manual. Water demand is 
assessed bottom up based on crop water demands, aggregated on the WUA level and 
compared with the water limits provided by the authorities. Based on this comparison 
cropping plans are adjusted. In case of water shortage during the irrigation season 
reductions are applied equally to all members which results in an equal loss of income 
to all of them. We also implemented an upstream-downstream effect which represents 
organizational and technical difficulties in delivering the water in a timely and 
sufficient manner to the users, and becomes more severe along the water flow 
gradient. The upstream-downstream effect reduces the net returns of the downstream 
farmers. This model constitutes the baseline for exploring the impact of informal 
institutions that will affect the allocation and distribution of water and disrupt the 
ideal delivery of water according to the formal rules. We are interested to investigate 
to which extent a WUA can cope with such disruptions and still produce the required 
crops and do so in an equitable manner.  
4.1. Further work  
Next to analysing the impact of the informal rules on the WUA we want to explore 
the social networks based on kinship or location in the irrigation network that 
facilitate the implementation of informal rules but also can support the adoption of 
new formal ones. Moreover we are interested in investigating the selection and 
implementation of rules which can easily be achieved through the agent-role pattern.   
Finally, the model can also be used to model the evolution of agents’ relationships 
and roles through institutional bricolage.  
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